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Abstract—The growing market for smart home IoT devices
promises new conveniences for consumers while presenting novel
challenges for preserving privacy within the home. Specifically,
Internet service providers or neighborhood WiFi eavesdroppers
can measure Internet traffic rates from smart home devices and
infer consumers’ private in-home behaviors. Here we propose
four strategies that device manufacturers and third parties can
take to protect consumers from side-channel traffic rate privacy
threats: 1) blocking traffic, 2) concealing DNS, 3) tunneling
traffic, and 4) shaping and injecting traffic. We hope that these
strategies, and the implementation nuances we discuss, will
provide a foundation for the future development of privacy-
sensitive smart homes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet-connected physical devices have rapidly increased
in popularity and commercial availability within the past
several years. This trend, called the Internet of Things (IoT),
includes many consumer products sold to replace traditional
non-networked home appliances or introduce novel technolo-
gies into consumer homes. These devices promise many ad-
vantages, including reduced energy consumption, more effec-
tive health management, and living spaces that react adaptively
to fit consumers’ lifestyles.
However, a future with “smart” homes containing numerous
Internet-connected devices raises substantial privacy concerns.
In earlier work, we demonstrated that a passive network
observer can infer sensitive information about consumers from
the network behavior of their smart home devices, even when
those devices use encryption [1]. Such observers include Inter-
net service providers (ISPs), WiFi eavesdroppers, or state-level
surveillance entities. Even without the contents of network
traffic, observers can use Domain Name System (DNS) queries
to identify smart home devices with potential ramifications for
consumer privacy. For example, learning that a consumer has
an IoT blood sugar monitor or pacemaker effectively reveals
a diabetes or heart-disease diagnosis, respectively.
Once observers identify particular smart home devices,
they can then use traffic rates from identified devices to
infer potentially private consumer activities. By testing several
commercially-available devices, we found that changes in
traffic rates closely correlated to consumer behaviors. For
example, specific changes in traffic from a sleep monitor
revealed consumer sleep patterns [1].
Policymakers are already concerned with known security
and privacy issues in smart home devices and have solicited
ideas for how to protect consumers [2]. Our results present
a new class of side-channel privacy threats that policymakers
and engineers will have to take into account. In this paper,
we present strategies for addressing these threats and evaluate
their effectiveness. Each proposed strategy seeks to prevent
device identification or behavior inference by limiting an
observer’s access to or confidence in data collected from a
smart home. The strategies could be deployed on individual
devices or on third-party hubs or routers.
We consider four strategies in light of two types of ob-
servers: a last-mile network observer (such as an ISP) and a
WiFi eavesdropper:
1) Blocking outgoing connections to deprive an observer
of smart home device data.
2) Encrypting DNS queries to prevent an observer from
identifying devices.
3) Tunneling all smart home traffic through a virtual private
network (VPN), preventing an observer from correlating
tunneled traffic originating from a smart home to indi-
vidual devices.
4) Shaping or injecting traffic to limit an observer’s confi-
dence when identifying devices or inferring behaviors,
either by masking interesting traffic patterns or spoofing
devices that are not on the network.
Consumer privacy in the context of IoT smart homes has
sparked considerable interest in industry, government, and the
general public. Given that IoT traffic rate metadata is an
understudied threat, we hope that the discussion and recom-
mendations in this paper inform the design and deployment of
IoT privacy solutions.
II. ADVERSARIAL MODELS
Our analysis involves two adversarial models relevant to the
privacy concerns of smart home device owners.
The first model is a last-mile passive network observer. This
observer has the ability to collect and analyze traffic from
the external interface of a smart home gateway router. It has
no access to local area network (LAN) traffic from within
the home network nor can it manipulate traffic. The ISP that
operates the last-mile connection to a consumer’s smart home
is a concrete example of this type of adversary.
The second model is a WiFi eavesdropper. An adversary
in this model is located close enough to a smart home’s
WiFi network to intercept WiFi radio transmissions, but does
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not have the credentials to associate with the smart home’s
WiFi access point. This prevents the adversary from reading
encrypted packet contents after 802.11 headers (which include
MAC addresses). A neighbor in an adjacent apartment or a
discrete radio receiver placed near a smart home are real-world
examples of this type of adversary.
Despite their differences, these two adversaries both have
access to traffic rate metadata. Each adversary can also as-
sociate traffic with individual devices using MAC addresses
(for the WiFi eavesdropper) or IP addresses (for the last-
mile observer). This is possible even if the adversary has not
identified device types.
We assume that neither adversary has access to packet
contents. In the case of the last-mile network observer, many
smart home IoT devices follow best practices and use SSL
encryption to protect application-layer contents [1]. The WiFi
eavesdropper cannot read IP or transport layer headers en-
crypted by the WPA2 protocol on password-protected access
points.
III. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS THREAT
Here we provide an overview of the techniques employed in
our previous research to learn sensitive consumer information
from metadata of encrypted smart home device traffic [1].
A. Device identification
An adversary observing network traffic from a consumer
smart home can separate the traffic into streams and associate
each stream with an individual device. The simplest way to
do this is to group traffic by the IP addresses of the external
services with which the devices are communicating. DNS
queries for domain names corresponding to these IP addresses
often contain the name of the device manufacturer or even
the make of the device itself. A last-mile observer can use
these unencrypted DNS queries to identify the type of devices
generating the traffic.
This approach is not possible for a WiFi eavesdropper,
because DNS queries are encrypted in WiFi radio frames. Al-
though DNS queries make identification easy, we demonstrate
in this paper that DNS queries are ultimately unnecessary.
Instead, an adversary can identify devices using simple su-
pervised machine learning on traffic rate metadata (§ IV-B).
B. Behavior inference
Learning the identity of individual smart home devices
allows the adversary to infer sensitive consumer behaviors
from changes in traffic patterns. Given the limited-purpose
nature of many IoT devices (e.g., a smart power outlet’s only
function is turning on or off), it is often straightforward for
an adversary to map changes in traffic rates to a particular
consumer actions. We examined a commercially-available IoT
sleep monitor, personal assistant, security camera, and smart
power outlet and found that each allowed an adversary to
easily infer consumer behaviors from traffic patterns. We
believe that this type of side-channel privacy attack using
traffic rate metadata is applicable to a broad range of IoT
smart home devices.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR SMART HOME PRIVACY
PRESERVATION
Here we present four technical strategies to protect con-
sumers from smart home traffic rate metadata privacy threats.
We evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies under last-
mile observer and WiFi eavesdropper adversary models and
compare their feasibility with or without device manufacturer
support. We consider smart homes with a variety of WiFi
devices from multiple manufacturers.
A. Blocking traffic
One strategy for preventing device identification and con-
sumer behavior inference is to prevent an adversary from col-
lecting smart home network traffic in the first place. The most
naive method is to deploy a firewall that prevents all IoT device
traffic from leaving a smart home’s local network. Configuring
such a firewall is straightforward on an intermediate hub-like
device or the home gateway router. However, the success of
this approach depends on the extent to which devices retain
their functionality when blocked from the Internet.
We tested the effect of removing Internet connectivity from
seven commercially available devices while maintaining the
local network (Figure 1). Four of the devices retained limited
functionality, although many “smart” features which distin-
guish these devices from their non-IoT analogs were lost. The
remaining three devices had no functionality without Internet
connection and were completely unusable. This was somewhat
unexpected, because there is no technical reason why these de-
vices could not have continued to partially function. The sleep
monitor still could have reported current sleeping conditions
detected using on-device sensors. The security cameras could
have allowed a smartphone also on the local network to view
the video feed (e.g., for monitoring an infant while in another
room).
These results suggest that many device manufacturers fail
to include in the design of their device a strong “minimum
reliable product” [3]. A smart device’s “minimum reliable
product” is its basic functionality in the absence of cloud
support. For our purposes, a strong minimum reliable product
could allow a user to enjoy their smart device while blocking
privacy-compromising network communications. In general,
providing minimal device functionality in the absence of the
Internet makes products more robust. For example, a smart
thermostat should, at the very least, match the functionality of
a traditional thermostat if its server goes down. In one case,
Nest users lost heat in their homes when their thermostats
failed to connect to Nest servers—an obviously poor user
experience [4]. For these reasons, policymakers should encour-
age device manufacturers to consider their device’s minimum
reliable product during development.
Rather than blocking all traffic indiscriminately, a hub or
router could use more advanced analysis to discern what
specific traffic from each device can be blocked safely. If
done correctly, smart home devices could function effectively
while particularly sensitive traffic streams are prevented from
Device Functionality Description
Amazon Echo limited Can use as a bluetooth speaker with previously paired smartphone
Echo recognizes “Alexa” keyword but does not provide any voice-control features
Belkin WeMo Switch limited Can turn switch on/off with physical button on device
Cannot use smartphone app to control device even when phone on local network
Orvibo Smart Socket limited Can turn switch on/off with physical button on device or smartphone app on local network
TP-Link Smart Plug limited Can turn switch on/off with physical button on device or smartphone app on local network
Nest Security Camera none Unable to view video feed or receive detected motion notifications
Amcrest Security Camera none Unable to view video feed or control camera direction
Sense Sleep Monitor none Monitor does not record sleep data
Light-based UI does not reflect local sensor readings
Cannot use smartphone app to control device or access current data
Fig. 1. All tested commercially-available IoT devices had limited or no functionality when firewalled to prevent communication outside of the smart home
LAN. This suggests that device manufacturers should be encouraged to improve their “minimum reliable product.”
leaving the home. One possible approach is for device de-
velopers to intentionally separate information sent to cloud
servers into multiple streams categorized by information type
and/or necessity for device functionality. A firewall could then
block specific streams to trade-off consumers’ privacy versus
usability preferences.
There may be cases where a developer is unable to separate
streams or is disincentivized to allow the consumer to block
specific streams. Without developer support, a third-party hub
or router could potentially learn what traffic from particular
devices can be blocked without excessively limiting function-
ality. However, encrypted traffic contents and the potential for
delayed device failures makes this an open research question.
Blocking traffic will not prevent a WiFi eavesdropper
from collecting WiFi frames between IoT devices and the
home gateway router. Nevertheless, the development of
functionality-preserving methods for blocking specific traffic
streams would be a major step forward for protecting private
consumer behavior from last-mile observers.
B. Concealing DNS
DNS queries from smart home devices often contain or
provide clues to the name of the device manufacturer or
the device type itself [1]. Last-mile observers can therefore
use DNS to identify devices inside a smart home. Masking
DNS queries could prevent device identification by last mile
observers, limiting their ability to infer consumer behaviors
from traffic rates. This would be similar to the limits that
already exist on Wifi eavesdroppers. WiFi eavesdroppers do
not have access to DNS queries because they are contained in
an inner layer of an encrypted 802.11 frame.
However, we have found that while preventing access to
DNS queries makes device identification more difficult, it
is still possible to identify devices using simple supervised
machine learning on device traffic rates. We collected two
hours worth of network traffic from six smart home IoT
devices operating with minimal user interactions. This traffic
was separated into sets corresponding to individual devices and
converted into time series vectors. Vector elements contained
the amount of traffic (bytes) sent or received by the device
in consecutive s-second samples. These vectors were further
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Fig. 2. Traffic to and from individual smart home devices clusters well by the
mean and standard deviation of traffic volume within a several-minute time
window. This indicates that device identification is possible using machine
learning on traffic rates without additional categorical information (e.g., DNS
queries).
divided into w-second windows. Windows were processed into
2-element feature vectors containing the mean and standard
deviation of the traffic amounts in the elements of each
window. These simple feature vectors clustered well by the
device responsible for the traffic (Figure 2).
A k-nearest-neighbors classifier trained on these feature vec-
tors resulted in greater than 95% accuracy classifications for a
range of w, s, and k (Figure 3). Accuracies were determined
by 10-fold stratified cross-validation on the training set. The
success of such simple machine learning methods indicates
that an adversary, especially one with more data and more
sophisticated models, could likely use machine learning to
identify devices from consumer data.
This approach does have a drawback: it requires the ob-
server to obtain training data for every IoT device that the
observer wishes to potentially identify. Given the number
of new IoT devices entering the market, it is likely that
only well-resourced observers could maintain a sophisticated
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Window size (sec)
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
cc
u
ra
cy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Sampling rate (sec)
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
A
cc
u
ra
cy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of neighbors
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
A
cc
u
ra
cy
Fig. 3. Simple supervised machine learning can perform high-accuracy device
identification from smart home traffic rates. These plots show the accuracy
of a k-nearest-neighbors classifier identifying which of six commercially-
available smart home devices generated the traffic within a time window for
varying window size, sampling rate, and number of neighbors k. Accuracies
determined by 10-fold stratified cross-validation.
enough training set for high accuracy classification from all
smart homes. Further, it is possible that it will be harder
to distinguish devices based on our chosen features as more
devices enter the market. Future research focused on using
machine learning in this domain will be necessary to support
or refute our initial findings that devices are identifiable
from traffic rate metadata alone. Until then, concealing DNS
significantly raises the barrier to device identification for last-
mile observers.
The smart home domain further motivates the need for
encrypted DNS, for which there are already proposals [5], [6].
C. Tunneling traffic
Another strategy for preventing device identification and
consumer behavior inference is to tunnel all smart home traffic
through a virtual private network (VPN). This would be done
to impede a last-mile observer’s ability to split traffic into
individual streams and associate those streams with specific
devices.
A VPN wraps all traffic from an endpoint (like a home
gateway router) in an additional transport layer, aggregating
it into a single stream. This stream has the source IP address
of the home gateway router and the destination IP address
of the server implementing the VPN exit point. In effect, a
adversary would see all traffic as originating and terminating
from a single pair of endpoints, rather than from individual
smart home devices and their cloud servers.
We evaluated the effectiveness of a VPN in preventing
traffic-splitting. We removed all information from our recorded
IoT traffic data other than network traffic rates aggregated
over all devices. We have yet to find a general method of
associating traffic back to individual devices without knowing
the number of devices or using categorical header information.
When many IoT devices send traffic simultaneously, noise
variations in traffic rates of high-rate devices can mask the
entire traffic patterns of other devices. This makes it difficult to
determine which variations in the overall traffic rate observed
from outside a VPN correspond to individual devices.
However, it is possible that in specific, limited circum-
stances a dedicated observer could infer individual devices’
traffic even when tunneled over a VPN. If there are multiple
devices that send traffic at different times, supervised machine
learning could be used to identify devices because most time
windows would contain traffic from only a single device. Even
if device traffic overlaps, an observer could possibly infer
the presence of the device that sends the most traffic if it
significantly overshadows the traffic from other devices.
Outside of these specific cases, the wider deployment of
VPNs into smart homes would be an effective solution to the
traffic rate privacy threat from last-mile observers. However,
there are several drawbacks to relying on VPNs as the sole
solution. Properly setting up a home VPN is difficult for the
typical consumer [7]. This could make the cost of widespread
VPN deployment prohibitively high. A well-designed smart
home hub could make deployment easier. If the hub acted
as a WiFi access point for multiple smart home devices, it
could come pre-configured as a VPN and be relatively easy
for consumers to use.
Using a VPN does not prevent the VPN exit node’s last-mile
provider from performing device identification and behavior
inference. This problem could be addressed by having the
VPN provider act as an endpoint for traffic from multiple
smart homes. In that case, it would be difficult for the VPN’s
last-mile provider to associate devices with a particular smart
home. We believe that such “mixes” for smart homes could
work in a similar fashion as anonymity mixes in other contexts
[8], [9].
Using a VPN to prevent device identification and behav-
ior inference has no effect on the WiFi eavesdropper. WiFi
transmissions from individual devices can still be intercepted
independently of a hub or gateway router using a VPN.
D. Shaping and injecting traffic
The previous strategies predominantly address the traffic
rate privacy threat in the context of last-mile observers. WiFi
eavesdroppers present a greater difficulty since they are able to
directly measure radio traffic coming to and from each smart
home device.
In the case of the WiFi eavesdropper, it is therefore neces-
sary to shape or inject traffic to reduce the observer’s confi-
dence in device identification or behavior inference. Shaping
or injecting traffic would also help protect against a last-mile
observer when a VPN is not entirely effective at preventing
traffic disaggregation. Solutions involving traffic shaping or
injection could be implemented by device manufacturers or
by a third-party on a hub or gateway router.
1) Device manufacturer implementation: Developers could
implement devices such that network traffic doesn’t directly
correspond to user behavior in real-time. For some applications
this make sense. A sleep monitor, for instance, does not need
to update a cloud service immediately upon detecting that a
user has gone to sleep—it could delay the notification for up
to several hours without sacrificing functionality. Introducing
random delays would reduce an observer’s confidence in
inferred sleep patterns. However, some devices rely on real-
time updates. A smart personal assistant cannot wait before
answering a user’s questions.
A device and its cloud service could also inject encrypted
traffic to maintain a constant traffic rate regardless of con-
sumer interactions. This would make idle device behavior
indistinguishable from interesting consumer behaviors. Since
data caps are a concern for consumers, maintaining a constant,
high traffic rate is not a viable solution [10].
Alternatively, a device could send decoy network traffic
when no consumer interaction has occurred. If done correctly,
this would lower an observer’s confidence in any behavior
inference. A device manufacturer with access to the device’s
software can trigger fake interactions indistinguishable from
real events.
When to inject traffic for fake consumer events depends on
the typical behavior of the consumer. It is important that fake
events happen at logical times (i.e. a smart personal assistant
shouldn’t answer a question after the user has gone to sleep)
and that their distribution reflect plausible consumer behaviors.
Doing so is a difficult problem, which we address below.
2) Third party implementations: Traffic spoofing solutions
could also be implemented on a third-party hub or gateway
router, which could protect multiple devices simultaneously.
The hub or router would first need to identify what traffic
patterns correspond to consumer behaviors. Unlike device de-
velopers, a third-party hub or router would have to infer what
traffic patterns map to consumer interactions for each device—
effectively having to perform the very behavior inference they
are trying to prevent. For example, a hub or router would need
to determine that an interaction with a smart outlet generates a
short, sharp spike in network traffic while an interaction with
a smart security camera creates an longer period of high traffic
volume. There is also indeterminancy in device traffic patterns
from real consumer interactions, so a hub or router would need
to generate a model to introduce realistic noise into injected
traffic.
For some devices, even deciding what constitutes a discrete
consumer interaction is an open question. For example, a
fitness tracker records a consumer’s individual footsteps. A
set of steps could constitute a “walk to the car.” Should a
third-party hub or router attempt to mimic individual steps,
or a logical walk? With such device-dependent consumer
interactions, identifying which traffic patterns to mimic in a
robust, automated way is an open research problem.
A second difficulty of spoofing traffic for third-party hubs
and routers is deciding when to initiate decoy interactions. This
is also a difficulty for device manufacturers, though they may
have better models for how consumers use their proprietary
devices. Conceptually, decoy interactions should function like
“parallel realities.” The goal of injecting decoy actions is to
make it difficult for an observer to choose which reality is the
correct one. The distribution of decoy events every day must
therefore resemble the distribution of real events. Consider a
consumer who owns a smart home door lock that sends traffic
indicating when the consumer has returned home from work.
Well-formed decoy traffic would not create a parallel reality
in which the consumer interacted with a personal assistant
device located in their home before they returned home from
work. Creating logically-sound parallel realities is difficult,
especially as the number of devices increases.
Finally, after deciding what to mimic and when, a third-
party hub or router has to decide how it will implement decoy
injection. Replaying recorded TCP connections is impossible
because they are encrypted. If a third-party attempts to forge a
new connection with a cloud server, the resulting traffic profile
is unlikely to resemble a real device’s traffic pattern [11].
A VPN helps overcome this obstacle, since decoy traffic
can be sent to the VPN endpoint rather than a device’s cloud
service. As long as the VPN endpoint cooperates, the router
or hub can exchange spurious communication with the VPN
endpoint acting as the cloud server. To a last-mile observer, the
traffic between the home and the VPN endpoint would appear
to contain meaningful consumer actions when no meaningful
communication has taken place. This would limit possible
behavior inference by a last-mile observer in the special cases
when a VPN by itself is insufficient.
However, sending decoy traffic over a VPN still does not
protect against a WiFi eavesdropper because no additional
802.11 frames are generated—all traffic is going out on the
wire. A third-party hub or gateway router must also forge
decoy WiFi frames with MAC addresses spoofed to match
the addresses of the smart home devices.
There are sophisticated methods a WiFi eavesdropper could
employ to discover which frames have spoofed MAC ad-
dresses. The origin of WiFi radio signals can be triangulated
to their source using signal strengths recorded from a multi-
antenna array [12]. Therefore, even if a third-party hub or
router perfectly mimics a device over WiFi, it is possible that
a sophisticated enough eavesdropper could deduce which radio
traffic is fake.
Though difficult to implement, traffic spoofing and injection
would offer probabilistic guarantees of safety against traffic
metadata privacy threats. We are currently researching how to
shape or inject smart home traffic to provably protect consumer
privacy while minimizing the amount of additional traffic
needed.
V. DISCUSSION
We have outlined several technical strategies to limit an
observer’s ability to identify smart home devices and infer
consumer behavior. While these strategies will require further
research before they are ready for consumer use, we make the
following specific recommendations:
• Developers should consider how their devices default to a
“minimum reliable product” in the face of limited Internet
connectivity.
• The Internet ecosystem should work towards an encrypted
DNS protocol.
• Smart home hubs and gateway routers should provide
consumers with the ability to easily configure their de-
vices to use VPNs.
• Researchers should continue to explore traffic shaping
techniques that would limit an adversary’s ability to infer
sensitive consumer information from traffic rate metadata.
Policy measures could also play a role in enacting these
and other suggestions for protecting consumers against the im-
proper use of traffic rate metadata. For example, policymakers
should push device manufacturers to ensure that their devices
default to a “minimum reliable product” as described above.
This would allow consumers to enjoy some of the benefits of
smart devices while selectively limiting outgoing traffic from
those devices.
Policymakers could also regulate how actors like Internet
service providers collect and use traffic rate information. The
Federal Communications Commission enacted new rules in
2016 that impacted how Internet Service Providers could
collect and use data [13], however, these rules seem likely
to change in the coming months. Future regulation that gives
consumers transparency and control over the collection and
use of smart home traffic data would help address the issues
we have presented and alleviate privacy concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
The side-channel privacy threat of traffic rate metadata
will continue to grow along with the market for IoT smart
home devices. In this paper, we proposed and evaluated four
strategies to protect against this threat, including blocking
traffic, concealing DNS, tunneling traffic, and shaping and
injecting traffic. While there is unlikely to be a single “silver
bullet” solution, each of our proposed strategies would be
effective under specific circumstances and provides a frame-
work for further development. We hope that this discussion
assists researchers, policymakers, and device manufacturers
attempting to create privacy solutions and contributes to the
growing interest in the privacy implications of smart home IoT
devices.
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